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The International State System after Neoliberalism
1Abstract: In 1945 Karl Polanyi outlined a vision of a peacetime global 
state system with a political economy in which small countries could be 
both sovereign and democratic. The present essay reviews developments 
between then and now in the light of Polanyi’s analytical framework. Par-
ticular attention is paid to the history of the European Union, which after 
the end of Communism turned into a mainstay of the neoliberal project, 
culminating in its restoration of an international gold standard under Mon-
etary Union. In the crisis of 2008 the advance of neoliberalism got stuck 
due to “populist” resistance to austerity and the shift of governance from 
the national to a supranational level. The paper explores the prospects of 
current attempts to replace the “Social Europe” and “trickle-down” narra-
tives of European superstate formation, which have lost all credit, with a 
story about a European army as a necessary condition of a successful de-
fense of “the European way of life”.
Keywords: Political Economy, Polanyi, Democracy, Neoliberalism, Euro-
pean integration, NATO, International Relations
In 1945, a year after his Great Transformation, Karl Polanyi published a short, 
densely argued article in a journal called The London Quarterly of World Af-
fairs, under the title of “Universal Capitalism or Regional Planning?” (Po-
lanyi 1945).2 In this article Polanyi explores the relationship between what 
he calls “the organization of the international life” and the structures and 
politics of the leading states of his time, arguing that changes under way 
potentially offered a prospect of new, “far-flung and meaningful policies 
which may, albeit incidentally, fulfil the deeply rooted aspirations of the com-
mon man”. Focusing on “Great Britain, Russia, and America” – the three 
global powers left standing after the Second World War – Polanyi argues 
that what was now “at issue” between them was “not so much their place in 
a given pattern of power, as the pattern itself” (italics in the original). Here, 
“the tremendous event of our age” was “the simultaneous downfall of liberal 
capitalism, world-revolutionary socialism and racial domination – the three 
competing forms of universalist societies”.3 According to Polanyi, it was 
precisely because of the end of globalist universalism that “a new era of in-
ternational politics” had become possible, allowing for peaceful coexistence 
of different regimes of international order in different regions of the world, 
based on and including different settlements of the class conflict:
1 Lecture in Human Sciences at the Institut für die Wissenschaft vom Menschen (IWM), Wien, June 5, 
2019.
2 Reprinted in Cangiani and Thomasberger (2018, 231-240). I am grateful to Michael Brie for drawing my 
attention to this important text.
3 While Polanyi is not explicit on where he sees “racial domination”, I believe he includes in this cat-






































World-revolutionary socialism was overcome by ‘regional’ socialism 
in the sufferings and glories of the Five Year Plans, the tribulations 
of the Trials, and the triumph of Stalingrad; liberal capitalism came 
to an end in the collapse of the gold standard, which left millions of 
unemployed and unparalleled social deprivation in its wake; Hitler’s 
principle of domination is being crushed on a battlefield co-exten-
sive with the planet he attempted to conquer; and out of the great 
mutation various forms of inherently limited existence emerge – 
new forms of socialism, of capitalism, of planned and semi-planned 
economies – each of them, by their very nature, regional.
Polanyi’s principal example for the salutary international consequences 
of the change he saw from universalism to particularism is the breakdown 
of the gold standard in the interwar years, ending “the nineteenth century 
system of world economy” and resulting “in the immediate emergence of 
economic units of limited extent”. Each of these was now forced “to look 
after its own ‘foreign economy’4 which has formerly ‘looked after itself’”:
New organs had to be developed, new institutions had to be set up 
to cope with the situation. The peoples of the world are now living 
under these new conditions… Their ‘foreign economy’ is the govern-
ment’s concern: their currency is managed; their foreign trade and 
foreign loans are controlled. Their domestic institutions may differ 
widely, but the institutions with the help of which they deal with 
their ‘foreign economy’ are practically identical. The new permanent 
pattern of world affairs is one of regional systems co-existing side 
by side.
To explore the emerging pluralist “pattern of world affairs” further, Po-
lanyi first considers the United States, which he regards as a “notable 
exception” and, in this respect, a potential source of systemic instability. 
The U.S., he writes, “has remained the home of liberal capitalism and is 
powerful enough to pursue the Utopian line of policy involved in such a 
fateful dispensation”, namely to attempt “to restore the pre-1914 world-
order, together with its gold standard” – “utopian” because, according to 
Polanyi, such restoration is “inherently impossible”. For various histori-
cal reasons, Polanyi continues, “Americans still believe in a way of life 
no longer supported by the common people in the rest of the world, but 
which nevertheless implies a universality which commits those who be-
lieve in it to reconquer the globe on its behalf”. This was different from 
the Soviet Union where “[t]he victory of Stalinism over Trotskyism meant 
a change in her foreign policy from a rigid universalism, relying on the 
4 In a footnote Polanyi explains that by “foreign economy” he means “the movement of goods, loans 
and payments across the borders of a country” – probably an English translation of the German con-
cept of Außenwirtschaft.
hope of a world revolution, to a regionalism bordering on isolationism”. 
The “startling novelty of Stalin’s policy” was that he was willing, Polanyi 
maintains, to content himself with building a cordon sanitaire around Rus-
sia, of countries that did not have to be socialist or communist provided 
their class structures were reshaped so that they were no longer likely to 
support deadly attacks on Soviet Russia. All that was needed was “the 
destruction of the political power of the feudal classes” – a revolution 
“far safer than the traditional, unlimited socialist one which, at least in 
Eastern Europe, would either provoke a fascist counter-revolution, or else 
could maintain themselves [sic!] only with the help of Russian bayonets, 
which Russia has no intention of providing [my italics]”. “Nothing”, Po-
lanyi continues, “could be less appealing to the conventional revolution-
ary” than the Stalinist turn from revolutionary universalism to this new 
kind of regionalist particularism. 
The upshot, then, was that “the British commonwealth and the 
U.S.S.R.” now were parts of a new system of regional powers “while the 
United States insist[ed] on a universalist conception of world affairs 
which tallies with her antiquated liberal economy”. Regionalism as a 
formula for peace among neighboring countries takes into account the 
communitarian particularism of the human condition and draws practical 
lessons from the observation during the war of “how overwhelmingly the 
people rally behind policies designed to protect the[ir] community from 
external danger”. It was in exchange for a “secure national existence”, 
so Polanyi, that the Russia of 1945 asked its regional neighbors to “rid 
themselves of incurably reactionary classes” through “expropriations and 
eventually confiscations”, reorganizing themselves, not in order to adopt 
a universal model of a good society, but to be capable of living in peace 
with their neighbors. “Socialization of the new kind”, Polanyi writes with 
reference to Eastern Europe and the regional neighborhood of the victori-
ous Soviet Union, was “emphatically not an article for export. It is a foun-
dation of national existence”.5
It is in his further examination of what he thought was the emerging 
postwar peace settlement for the Eastern European region that Polanyi 
arrives at the core of his argument in favor of a regionally subdivided and 
regionally regulated, planned global order. Eastern Europe, Polanyi notes, 
was traditionally beset with “at least three endemic political diseases 
– intolerant nationalism, petty sovereignties and economic non-cooper-
ation”. Here as elsewhere, the rise of nationalism, according to Polanyi, 
“coincided with the territories brought under the control of a credit sys-
tem by autochthonous middle classes”. Ethnic conflicts – in Polanyi’s 
words “unresolved racial issues” – were also reinforced by unfettered 
5 I cannot judge the accuracy of Polanyi’s judgment at the time of his writing. On the surface there is 
much that speaks for it; that things turned out differently later (see below) may have been contrary 
to the intentions of the Soviet leadership at the time. For the present argument, which is systemic not 
historical, it doesn’t matter if Polanyi’s intuition was historically correct or not. 






































economic competition between countries, with a gold standard “foreign 
economy” forcing governments to leave it to the market to balance their 
countries’ external accounts. This, Polanyi claims, came to an end wher-
ever during the interwar period “market methods were”, under Soviet-
Russian leadership, “discarded for planned trading”. Then, “intractable 
chauvinisms lost their viciousness, national sovereignty became less 
maniacal, and economic cooperation was regarded again as being of mu-
tual help instead of being feared as a threat to the prosperity of the state. 
In effect, as soon as the credit system is based no longer on ‘confidence’ 
but on administration, finance, which rules by panic, is deposed, and san-
ity can prevail.”
The lessons Polanyi drew from this for the rest of the world were 
far-reaching. “If”, he writes, “the Atlantic Charter6 really committed us 
to restore free markets where they have disappeared, we might thereby 
be opening the door to the reintroduction of a crazy nationalism into 
regions from which it has disappeared.” Liberal capitalism would then 
become “a matter of foreign policies”, based on “foreign buying and 
selling, lending and borrowing, and the exchange of foreign currencies 
carried on between individuals, as if they were members of one and the 
same country”, with the market expected to balance the economic rela-
tions between countries “automatically – that is, without the intervention 
of their governments”. This failed in the 1930s, and the gold standard had 
to be abandoned. Now, however, regional planning offered “new methods 
of ‘foreign economy’” that were conducive to international peace and co-
operation, as they allowed for a mutually beneficial “distribution of raw 
materials, the stabilizing of prices, and even the ensuring of full employ-
ment in all countries”. It was only the United States that was placing its 
hopes on a “universal system of marketing”, although this “would involve 
the impossible task of first restoring the market system throughout the 
world”. While it might take time for the United States to understand that 
its concept of international political economy is “doomed to failure”, the 
promising “alternative to the reactionary Utopia of Wall Street is deliber-
ate development of the new instruments and organs of foreign trading, 
lending and paying, which constitute the essence of regional planning”. 
Polanyi ends his discussion with a fascinating analysis of the situa-
tion of the United Kingdom, the country where he was then living. Polanyi 
saw Britain as dependent on imports, “for maintaining a civilized stan-
dard of life” and “the survival of the Commonwealth”, on “free coopera-
tion with overseas dominions” which were no longer colonies. A “planned 
foreign economy” would enable the country to “reap the huge economic 
and political advantages of the regional organization of the world”. In 
6 The Atlantic Charter was drafted by Roosevelt and Churchill in August 1941, meeting aboard the 
battleship HMS Prince of Wales near Newfoundland. It defined the political and economic goals of 
the Allies for the time after the war, months before the United States officially entered it. One of the 
eight items listed was a general lowering of trade barriers.
fact, after the changes it had undergone since the 1930s, Britain was “no 
longer a free-trading country” at all, which had made it more of a popular 
democracy than ever – “more healthily united with every year that has 
passed since she left the atmosphere of liberal capitalism, free competi-
tion, the gold standard, and all the other names under which a market-so-
ciety is hallowed”. This, however, was irreversible. “The real issue today”, 
Polanyi wrote, was that “reactionaries still hope that it is not yet too late 
for Britain’s own system of foreign economy to be changed back so that it 
may fall in line with that of America”. This way Britain would not just lose 
the advantages of equal cooperation with the United States and the So-
viet Union but would also be deprived “of those organs of external trade 
which she needs for her survival”, as well as of “her freedom of action, a 
rising standard of life, and the advantages of a constructive peace for a 
long time to come”. American-style economic universalism would imply 
a return to the gold standard, in substance if not in name, in that it would 
involve “the balancing of ‘foreign economy’ through automatic movement 
of trade, i.e. through the undirected trade of private individuals and firms. 
The battle over the gold standard”, Polanyi adds, “is in reality a battle for 
and against regional planning”. Fighting that battle on the side of “a uni-
versalist conspiracy to make the world safe for the gold standard” were 
the old ruling classes of British society, afraid of “a new egalitarian im-
pulse” that might “fuse Disraeli’s Two Nations into one… Contrary to na-
tional interest, they might attempt to restore universal capitalism, instead 
of striking out boldly on the paths of regional planning.”
The Rise and Decline of Neoliberalism
What became of the world as projected by Karl Polanyi at that fateful 
historical turning point, the end of the twentieth century’s Great De-
struction? While some of his predictions were obviously falsified by the 
course of events, others were not. Even his misses and near-misses, 
however, appear astonishingly productive for description and analysis 
of developments since 1945. What I believe stands out in Polanyi’s ap-
proach is how he relates the political institutions of countries, their 
states, especially with respect to their democratic character, to the 
nature of their economic relations with other, in particular neighboring 
countries, relating this in turn to, and in part conceiving it as conditional 
upon, the overall architecture of the encompassing global order. Link-
ing regional national statehood to the global international state system, 
Polanyi manages to shed light on the connection between national de-
mocracy and the way it is embedded, or not, in international markets, 
and national autonomy, or sovereignty, especially of small countries and 
states, as affected by the surrounding global order including its ability 
to keep peace. In this, Polanyi has, as I see it, forged a conceptual tool-
kit that carries his analysis far beyond its historical setting, the world 
of 1945, and indeed right into our time. In the following I will make an 
attempt to apply Polanyi’s analytical grid to the European state system 






































of today and explore what we can learn with its help for the future pros-
pects of Europe.
To begin with, the regionalization of socialism inside the cordon 
sanitaire around the Soviet Union’s communism in one country proved 
less resilient to U.S. universalistic expansionism than hoped for, with 
far-reaching consequences for the international order. As Polanyi an-
ticipated, the United States did indeed do its utmost to export its sys-
tem to the rest of the world, in confrontation with the other remaining 
superpower, and was remarkably successful. Offers of Marshall Plan 
aid to Eastern European countries, conditional on the adoption of a mar-
ket economy, threatened to turn the Soviet Union’s regional neighbors 
into hostile allies of its expansionist global rival, and were countered by 
military support for a revolutionary conversion to the Soviet political-
economic order. For roughly four decades, Eastern and Central Europe 
became incorporated in a more or less tightly integrated Soviet-Russian 
empire, confronted by and confronting a Western alliance of democrat-
ic-capitalist (“liberal-corporatist”) states built, originally, on the model 
of the American New Deal. That other, Western empire held together 
even when its hegemonic power, beginning in the 1980s, embarked on 
a global return to the precepts of economic liberalism pure and simple, 
no longer allowing its client states to choose between different national 
economic and social policies under the protection of Bretton Woods 
Keynesianism. This coincided with the Soviet Union finally losing the 
support, not just of its client peoples, but also of its own citizenry, as 
a result of both heavy-handed repression and the lures of consumer 
capitalism. In 1990, then, communism was ready to collapse into global 
capitalism, which subsequently felt free to abandon even the pretense 
of democratic redistributionism at home and pluralist institutionalism 
abroad.
What looked like victory, however, even like unconditional sur-
render, was only of short duration. Very soon the sole remaining su-
perpower, by then the uncontested hegemon of the, by now, capitalist 
world, began to suffer from overextension, just as previous imperial 
powers inevitably had. Lost wars, beginning in Vietnam and not ending 
in Afghanistan, and failed projects of “nation-building”, like in Iraq, or 
of “regime change” like in Syria, Iran and Libya, came together with con-
tinuing neglect of domestic problems, like a decaying infrastructure and 
rising inequality, as economic growth became reserved for a tiny oligar-
chy of private beneficiaries from public empire. Strong isolationist ten-
dencies among the electorate and resounding calls for economic pro-
tection against a world market in which the United States was no longer 
able to guarantee its citizens a secure seigneuriage paved the way to the 
U.S. presidency for an apparent isolationist-cum-protectionist – “Amer-
ica first!” – like Donald Trump. The result was a stand-off between the 
capitalist imperialism of the entrenched internationalist elites of the 
East Coast, aligned with the country’s huge military establishment, and 
a new, “populist” mainstream interested neither in international adven-
tures nor, in Polanyi’s term, a free-market “foreign economy”.
Turning to Western Europe, we find another historical trajectory 
that fits Polanyi’s concepts while deviating from his predictions. In the 
1950s, in good part at the instigation of the United States, Western Eu-
ropean countries did in fact engage in what came remarkably close to 
what Polanyi had called regional planning. The European Community for 
Coal and Steel in particular was created, along with similar institutions, 
to jointly administer a specific sector of neighboring countries’ national 
economies, taking into account their different economic needs and inter-
ests and thereby stabilizing peaceful relations among what were now the 
European members of an anti-Communist Western Alliance. Placing the 
key industries of industrial capitalism under supranational control was 
to prevent them being used for nationalist rearmament in defeated Ger-
many, like in the 1930s. It also gave European countries secure access to 
German coal, making it unnecessary for France in particular again to oc-
cupy the Ruhrgebiet, the center of German heavy industry, as it had from 
January 1923 to August 1925, with disastrous consequences for peace in 
Europe. Moreover, it helped manage the economic fortunes of an industry 
with strong trade unions and a tradition of labor conflict. Later, yet anoth-
er sector, nuclear power, believed at the time to be of foundational impor-
tance for a modern industrial economy, was in the same way entrusted to 
a special international authority, EURATOM, once more very much in line 
with the model of regional planning envisaged by Polanyi in 1945.
Soon, however, regional sectoral planning changed into something 
else. Step by step the scope of supranational jurisdiction increased, and 
so did the number of countries involved, from six originally to twelve in 
1989 and no less than 28 today. What had set out as joint sectoral plan-
ning began to appear, for a short while in the 1970s, as a prelude to re-
gional state-building. Sectoral technocratic administration seemed 
to be turning into general political authority, prospectively replacing 
national states with a supranational European superstate, and indeed 
super-welfare state, as horizontal cooperation seemed to be shading into 
hierarchical federalism. But rather than sovereign national states merg-
ing into a sovereign supranational state – something that, incidentally, 
never came to pass anywhere since the era of the nation-state began in 
earnest after the Second World War – what happened in fact was the dis-
solution of national economies through international treaties into a sec-
torally encompassing, supranational market economy. That economy was 
released from redistributive state intervention, not by the political will 
of a democratic state coterminous with it – a state that might by popular 
pressure be moved to reverse its political direction – but by a regional 
cluster of states banding together to keep each other in the neoliberal 
fold. Proceeding alongside with the return of the United States to its his-
torical drive for unfettered market liberalism, state-free market-building 
in economically integrated but politically un-united, and therefore only 






































negatively integrated, Western Europe moved, after the collapse of com-
munism and the break-up of its East European empire, on to international 
empire-building – a liberal empire of 28 states embedded in a stateless, 
supranational, post-democratic, pre-Keynesian market economy kept to-
gether by a hard, German-style common currency. 
As Polanyi would not have been surprised, the transition in the 
final decades of the twentieth century from “regional planning” to a 
new-old pattern of capitalist universalism institutionalized in a neolib-
eral regional superstate – for Polanyi a regressive reversal of postwar 
historical progress – revived the national and international conflicts of 
the era of the gold standard. In particular within EMU, relations between 
European countries are worse today than they ever were in the postwar 
period. Germany in particular, the new hegemon under the hard currency 
it has bestowed, willy-nilly, on its Western European allies, has become 
the target of deep nationalist animosities, especially among Mediterra-
nean countries including France.7 As countries find themselves and their 
“foreign economies” in unmitigated competition with one another – a 
condition that they cannot do anything about under the “four freedoms” 
and, in particular, the common currency that have become constitutive for 
the Europe of “European integration” – the democratic substance of their 
national political economies is being eroded. In response, popular coun-
termovements have sprung up that are rediscovering the institutional 
resources of national democracy to force governments to abandon their 
studied passivity and protect their societies’ economic fortunes and ac-
customed ways of life from the creatively destructive forces of “globaliza-
tion”. After in most if not all of the countries involved, the center-left had 
by the 1990s at the latest tied its future to a neoliberal revival of capitalist 
growth through economic internationalization, it is only the nationalist 
right that is today offering protectionist political rhetoric that speaks to 
those who feel threatened by an “open society” identified with a neolib-
eral economy. 
Since 2008, declining confidence in neoliberal “global governance” 
and its promise of universal economic advancement for those who “work 
hard and play by the rules” (Bill Clinton in the 1992 presidential cam-
paign) fueled the rise of new political parties – denounced as “populist” 
by the established political class and its media – that have broken up the 
centrist politics of postwar Western Europe. The result is a profound im-
passe between two incompatible political-economic projects: the neolib-
eral, supranationally centralized top-down technocracy of “globalization” 
– a neoliberal superstate, or better a super-market without a correspond-
ing state, held together by a firmly institutionalized de facto international 
7 A striking symptom of how German economic hegemony, and the ideological claim to moral leader-
ship that inevitably came with it, has shattered European peace are the recurring demands in coun-
tries like Greece and Italy, but also Poland, for German reparations, more than seventy years after the 
end of the War.
gold standard – and the anti-liberal, nationally decentralized bottom-up 
democracy8 of, often reactionary, popular countermovements of various 
kinds. One issue this raised was that of political scale: whether it was 
preferable for a political jurisdiction to be large or to be small, to merge 
with others to form a larger or split from others to form a smaller unit of 
governance.9 Today it appears that in this impasse the neoliberal advance 
has come to a halt, resulting for the time being in a political interregnum 
in which, to quote Gramsci, the old order is dying while a new order can-
not yet be born – a time in which all sorts of monstrosities can happen.10
Polanyi’s analytical toolkit may also be profitably used to shed light 
on British Brexit politics – on the particularly complex configuration of 
interests and perceptions vis-à-vis the European Union that is breaking 
up the British party system.11 For reasons of space I cannot go into this 
here.12 Instead I will turn to how not just Britain but the European region 
of the global economy as a whole – the European state system – might 
evolve under the cross-pressures of the post-neoliberal interregnum, pres-
8 Note that here “democracy” does not mean a catalogue of (middle-class) “values” to which “demo-
crats”, if they want to be ones, must subscribe. Rather it means institutions that give losers, political 
as well as economic, a chance to organize in order to accumulate, if not capital, then political power, 
and thereby force the attention of the winners.
9 The problem may also be put as the question of the extent to which governance should be conducted 
through international relations, with constituent units small, or through domestic relations inside one 
encompassing large unit. For more on this see Streeck (2019). See also a recent blog piece by Lee 
Jones, “The EU Referendum: Brexit, the Politics of Scale and State Transformation”: https://thedisor-
derofthings.com/2016/05/24/the-eu-referendum-brexit-the-politics-of-scale-and-state-transformation/
10 „La crisi consiste nel fatto che il vecchio muore e il nuovo non può nascere … in questo interregno 
si verificano i fenomeni morbosi più svariati.”
11 The manuscript was completed before the December 12 elections. 
12 For a brief sketch, “taking back control”, the slogan of the “Leavers”, can mean two things. One 
is cutting Britain loose from a neoliberal European superstate with its “four freedoms” that bind the 
country into an international market economy and prevent any sort of planning of its “foreign econo-
my”. The other is setting it free to join a borderless neoliberal globalism and economic universalism 
as promoted by the United States. While the former aims at restoring democratic economic gover-
nance on a smaller political scale than supranational Europe – a tendency toward local autonomy 
that is also present in Scottish separatism – the latter is to insure Britain against any possibility, 
however remote, of the EU subjecting the political economy of its member states to democratic inter-
ventionism. Both schools of Brexit supporters want to restore national sovereignty, but for opposite 
objectives: to domesticate market forces by means of sovereign national politics, and to merge into a 
United States-led universal market system, with “automatically” balanced national accounts. While 
pro-market Brexiteers see, and fear, in the EU a potential supranational welfare state, from which 
globalism is the escape, anti-market Brexiteers regard the EU as a neoliberal supranational market 
state designed to preclude anything like national economic planning. Correspondingly, among “Re-
mainers”, some want to stay in the EU for protection from totalitarian neoliberalism, whereas others 
emphasize the advantages for the British economy of the EU’s internal market, in particular its “four 
freedoms” productively exposing British firms and, above all, workers to international competition. 
Overlapping political alignments of this kind make for a messy politics between the lure of an elitist 
“market society” preserving the power and status of an old capitalist-colonialist ruling class – as 
represented by reactionaries like Rees-Mogg and Boris Johnson, who despise the postwar institu-
tions of class compromise and hope to leave them behind by blending into United States capitalist 
universalism – and the post-neoliberal prospect of a return to a mixed economy administered by a 
sovereign democratic nation-state.






































sures for both political-economic centralization and decentralization, for 
global capitalism on the one hand and democratic “regional planning” on 
the other, for neoliberal superstatism and democratic nationalism, and for 
economic universalism as well as particularism. Following the lead of Po-
lanyi, I will discuss this with reference to Europe’s broader global context.
A New Global Context
Comparing today’s world with Polanyi’s in 1945, the position in the lat-
ter of the Soviet Union is now filled by another, presumably, Communist 
country, China. There are similarities between the Soviet Union then and 
China today, but also differences. China, like Stalin’s postwar Soviet 
Union, at least as seen by Polanyi, has no desire to export its regime, let 
alone engage in world revolution, and indeed never in its long tradition 
as a nation seems to have aspired to anything like international hegemo-
ny.13 On the other hand, unlike the Soviet Union under Stalin, the China 
of today is in important respects a capitalist country, although how pre-
cisely the capitalist core of its economy and society relates to its Com-
munist shell remains a mystery in need of further research.14 Capitalism, 
however, is and inevitably must be expansionary, in particular where it is 
housed in a country too big to free-ride on another country carrying the 
burden – and reaping the benefits – of capitalist hegemony. Capitalism 
as a political-economic system needs a Machtstaat (Weber) as a center 
capable of securing for it a periphery where markets for raw materials 
and final products are safe and free to grow; as Rosa Luxemburg put it, it 
is by its very nature “land-grabbing”. That this may be so even for Com-
munist capitalism, if such a thing can exit, is indicated in recent years by 
the so-called New Silk Road initiative of the Chinese state. Also referred 
to as the One Belt One Road (OBOR) project, it is to extend the territorial 
reach of the Chinese economy, to an important if uncertain extent capital-
ist, along the southern rim of the Eurasian continent to the Balkans and 
the Mediterranean and well into West Africa. All of these places have for 
long been part of the European and later the American peripheral back-
yard and are today considered by the, more or less united, “West” as their 
and only their legitimate domain.
If, informed by Polanyi’s analysis of 1945, we want to understand 
the prospects for the European regional state system – centralized or 
decentralized, hierarchical or cooperative, vertically or horizontally or-
ganized – a key issue seems to be how the relationship between China 
and the United States will evolve. Points to consider include whether the 
two can work out a peaceful coexistence of different political-economic 
systems in a pluralist world order, like Polanyi had hoped for the postwar 
13 For more on this see Anderson (2017, 117-144).
14 For a fascinating analysis of the extent to which China is, or acts, capitalist, and what consequenc-
es this may have for its insertion of the global economy, see the recent book by Changing Kwan Lee 
(2017).
era, or alternatively can agree on a regime of dual hegemony and shared 
responsibility for a jointly governed capitalist world economy, or manage 
a peaceful transfer of power and privilege from the declining to the rising 
hegemon, all of which against the historical odds. Much of this would de-
pend on whether the isolationist tendencies in the United States will pre-
vail over the country’s military and foreign policy establishment; whether 
the U.S. can avoid falling into the so-called Trap of Thucydides,15 given its 
huge although declining military superiority16 and the extreme vulnerabili-
ty especially of the land-based branch of the New Silk Road; and what the 
geostrategic constraints and opportunities are of artificial intelligence 
and cyber war technology. 
None of this can be known with any degree of certainty at this time. 
Since becoming capitalist, in part or entirely, China has attempted sev-
eral times to mend fences with the U.S., perhaps even to fit itself into 
a U.S.-dominated capitalist world system. As Susan Watkins writes in 
an exemplarily concise analysis of Chinese-American relations today, 
Beijing had no ambition after the demise of the Soviet Union “to chal-
lenge head-on the new inter-state order”. Instead it tried to “upgrade [its] 
status within the American-run international system… ‘Maintain a low 
profile, hide brightness, do not seek leadership, but do some things’, in 
the wisdom attributed to Deng Xiaoping” (2019, 9f.). Lack of military ca-
pacity can be assumed to have played a role, perhaps also a longer time 
perspective on the part of what considers itself the oldest civilization on 
earth.17 China sought membership in the WTO and, according to Watkins 
(2019, 10), “with an eye to pleasing the Americans, it has lurched into ag-
gressive moves against ‘fraternal’ regimes: the disastrous invasion of 
Vietnam in 1979; dispatch of Uighurs to support the American-backed 
Mujahedeen in Afghanistan; joining the U.S.  in sanctions against North 
Korea. Belying its occasional fulminations against hegemonism, it cast 
15 Trying to understand the causes of the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta, the 
ancient Greek general and historian Thucydides suggested that a declining hegemon, in his case 
Sparta, watching a rising rival, at the time Athens, building up military strength, must be tempted, 
and indeed rationally motivated, to start a preventive war as long as its advantage is still enough to 
make victory certain, to the extent that there can be certainty in war at all. As the Journal, Foreign 
Policy, claimed in 2017, “The past 500 years have seen 16 cases in which a rising power threatened 
to displace a ruling one. Twelve of these ended in war.” The concept, “Thucydides’s Trap”, is credited 
to the American political scientist, Graham T. Allison (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Graham_T._
Allison#Thucydides's_Trap).
16 According to official U.S. government statistics, 165,000 active-duty military personnel were by the 
end of 2018 serving outside the United States. Nearly 40,000 are assigned to classified missions in 
locations that the U.S. government does not disclose. In 2018 the U.S. spent 649 billion dollars on its 
military, amounting to 36 percent of global military spending. Chinese spending is listed at 250 bil-
lion by SIPRI and 168 billion by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Russian spending is 
reported by the two sources to equal 61 and 63 billion, respectively. Since 1990, the U.S. was a leading 
participant in twenty major wars and in an untold number of smaller military operations.
17 Allegedly, when asked, by Nixon or Kissinger, what he thought of the French Revolution, the then 
Prime Minister of China, Zhou Enlai, said something like, “It is too early to tell”. If the story is not 
entirely true, it certainly seems well invented. 






































its UNSC vote in favor of the occupation of Iraq and the bombardment of 
Libya.” Above all, China patiently financed the American budget deficits 
by buying U.S. treasury bills, and did its best to avoid a confrontation 
over Taiwan, even when the Taiwanese government fell into the hands of a 
separatist opposition to the One China Kuomintang. 
Things may, however, have changed since the global financial cri-
sis, which put Chinese investment in the American housing market in 
jeopardy; with the turn of China to domestically driven growth, requiring 
huge imports of raw materials, especially from the Southern hemisphere; 
and finally with the New Silk Road, indispensable for further Chinese 
economic progress but inevitably challenging American and Western Eu-
ropean interests and positions in large parts of the world. Again, accord-
ing to Watkins, “the American imperium is so vast, so overweening in its 
demands, that any fast-rising power must immediately grate against it. Yet 
its military strength makes its overthrow impossible. Either submission 
or impasse must result” (p. 12). The best prediction, then, might be what 
Watkins calls “a concertina pattern of drawn-out attrition”: a long period 
of wavering, on both sides, between confrontation and accommodation, 
like in the present trade disputes, “summit-level agreements interspersed 
with alarms and shadow-boxing, sudden crises over spy planes, interven-
tions to fan or quell revolts”, alongside tense negotiations on old and new 
conflicts, on the New Silk Road with its innumerable pressure points, or 
over islands and non-islands in the South China Sea. 
A New Europe?
In which direction, if at all, will the European state system move out of its 
present impasse into a new, stable order: downward, back to democratic-
redistributionist politics “on the ground”, as demanded by nationalist 
communitarians? Or upward, to “more Europe” in the sense of more 
superstate enforcement of a politics-free market economy, as asked for 
by modern capital and promoted, more or less knowingly, by the Euro-
pean center-left, in the name of a new non-parochial, non-proletarian, 
middle-class-only kind of democracy? Here, Polanyi’s approach may be 
most helpful as it enables us to relate the structure of and the relations 
between the states of the European region to the evolving relationship 
between China and the U.S. For example, one question that Polanyi may 
inspire is what opportunities, if at all, that relationship may offer Euro-
pean centralists, faced with the resistance of populist “nationalists”, to 
establish credibility for a new “narrative”18 about a historical need for 
more “European integration”, replacing the abandoned social-democratic 
18 “Narrative” has become a popular concept recently. Having migrated from literary theory into 
politics, it roughly means a uplifting and motivating story, often a history, told to generate acceptance 
for something, a decision or an institution. A “narrative” is judged by its effect, not by its truth; if it 
doesn’t fulfill its function anymore it is replaced with another, more effective “narrative”. Politicians 
who have been unsuccessful trying to “sell” something to their electorate today typically call upon 
their advisers to provide them with “a new narrative”.
“European social model” from the 1970s, as well as the discredited neo-
liberal promise from the 1990s and early 2000s of borderless international 
markets producing prosperity for everybody and economic convergence 
for all.
In this respect, note the rising calls among European supranation-
alists for a “European army” to defend and expedite “European unity”.19 
Building an army is a classical avenue to state-building, not least since it 
comes with the identification of a foreign enemy establishing a Schmit-
tian Freund-Feind-Verhältnis helpful for social integration. While for some 
time now the designated “security risk” for Europe as an imagined com-
munity has been Russia, it is increasingly joined by China and even, in 
hostile reaction to Trumpist isolationism, the United States. European 
army-building as a pathway to European state-building had been tried 
before with the European Defense Community project of the early 1950s, 
which in the end was vetoed in 1954 by the French National Assembly. 
Now it is above all France that is pushing European military unification. 
Like in the 1950s, centrally important for this is Germany, which since 
2002, confirmed in 2014, is pledged to almost double its defense spending 
from 1.1 (in 2017) to 2 percent of GDP in 2024. While this is in response 
to long-standing demands by NATO, it is also insisted upon by France 
with a view to the creation of a sovereign European defense capacity. By 
spending two percent of its GDP on defense Germany would become the 
biggest military power in Europe, far ahead of Russia.20 Since Germany 
cannot and will not acquire nuclear weapons, all of its additional spend-
ing would be on conventional arms. To the extent that the German military 
would be Europeanized, in whatever form, increased German defense 
spending would ideally close the gaps in the French arsenal caused by the 
high costs of France’s nuclear force.21 Using defense as a lever for supra-
19 In October 2018, Jürgen Habermas, together with a handful of former Christian Democratic and 
Social Democratic politicians, issued an appeal, “For a solidary Europe”, characterized as “a Eu-
rope that protects our way of life” (published in Handelsblatt, October 21, 2018). “Trump, Russia and 
China“, according to the authors, “put Europe’s unity, our readiness to jointly stand up for our values 
and to defend our way of life to the test.” Further down, under the subtitle, “We Call for a European 
Army”, they demand “to begin now with a deepened integration of foreign and security policy on the 
basis of majority decisions and with the aim of a common European army”. This would not require 
more money, given that “European NATO members together spend about three times as much on 
defense as Russia”, but only “eine Überwindung der verteidigungspolitischen Kleinstaaterei” (roughly 
translated: that we leave behind our military small-state sectionalism). For more on the amount of 
defense spending in Europe as well as on Kleinstaaterei, see below. 
20 If Germany would now be spending two percent of its GDP on “defense”, it would in absolute 
terms be spending 40 percent more than Russia, whose budget includes its nuclear hardware. The 
Russian defense budget is expected to decline in coming years in absolute terms. 
21 It is not clear how seriously the German government takes its commitment under NATO to boost 
its military spending. Almost under the public radar, the Grand Coalition is spending 47.32 billion 
euros on defense in 2019, an increase of more than five billion compared to 2018, or of roughly twelve 
percent. In terms of GDP, this would amount to 1.35 percent in 2019, as compared to 1.23 percent in the 
previous year and to 1.12 percent in 2017. For 2020, a further increase is envisaged to 1.38 percent. As 
German Minister of Defense, Ursula von der Leyen promised Germany’s allies that that ratio will con-






































national political integration requires that European elites can point to an 
unstable or hostile international environment threatening peace, prosper-
ity and “the European way of life” (a phrase adopted by Merkel’s would-
be successor, Kramp-Karrenbauer, now Defense Minister in addition to 
CDU party leader, in her response to Macron’s project of a “refounding of 
Europe”, and taken up by von der Leyen as the new President of the Eu-
ropean Commission, where she was installed on pressure from Macron). 
While external dangers can always be overstated – like in the case of 
Russia – real tensions in the international system are obviously helpful.22
Taking my cues from Polanyi’s 1945 essay, I conclude by discuss-
ing three ideal-typical European trajectories out of the present political-
economic interregnum. The first would lead to a decentralized system of 
democratic nation-states, loosely integrated horizontally through negoti-
ated economic cooperation (with Polanyi, “regional planning”) – which 
in Europe would require replacing the Euro with a more flexible monetary 
regime.23 Globally, this would presuppose something like the international 
order Polanyi had hoped for: a balance of power between self-contained, 
non-expansionist states, or blocs of states, unwilling or in any case un-
tinue to grow to 1.5 percent in 2025, in spite of expected fiscal problems and, as a consequence, inten-
sifying conflicts with other political objectives. In fact, the latest medium-term budget forecast pro-
vided by the (Social-Democratic) Finance Minister indicates a decline rather than a rise after 2020 in 
the ratio of defense spending to GDP, to 1.26 in 2023. Obviously neither the United States nor France 
will be happy about this. It seems that both parties to the Grand Coalition, CDU/CSU and SPD, feel 
more bound by the two percent goal than they admit in public, given that higher arms spending of the 
dimension asked for must clearly mean lower spending on more popular items, in view of the stagnant 
tax revenues expected for the coming half decade. Note that the first public pronouncement of von der 
Leyen’s successor as defense minister, Kramp-Karrenbauer, even before she was sworn in, was that 
Germany had to live up to its two percent commitment.
22 Although European army-building would remain difficult enough. What would be the role of the 
nation-states in “European” defense? Who would be Commander-in-Chief, the successor to Herr 
Juncker, Frau von der Leyen? Would there be an integrated General Staff? How would the French 
nuclear force come in? (Would it be turned over to a “European” government?) This is not to say that 
there wouldn’t be some short-term benefits, of the usual, frugal European Union sort. A “European 
army”, even if it was in fact a collection of national army units, in particular German and French ones, 
could presumably recruit in places like Croatia or Kosovo, where military manpower is abundant and 
cheap; traditionalist resistance against mercenaries is more easily overcome if they are to fight for 
the “European project”, for example in French West Africa. A “European army” could also be a le-
gitimate pathway to legal immigration, from Libya or Afghanistan. It being governed by “Europe”, in 
whatever way, the German Bundestag may perhaps be persuaded to give up its postwar insistence 
on the German Bundeswehr being run as a Parlamentsarmee, with even the tiniest deployment of 
German troops having to be approved by a parliamentary majority. Probably the most practically 
important aspect of the “European army” project in the short term is that it comes with a commitment 
of France and Germany, laid down in the Treaty of Aachen of January, 2019, to merge their arms indus-
tries, with the consequence that the still quite ungenerous German guidelines on arms exports would 
be effectively preempted. (Maybe this is why several seasoned CDU politicians, now earning their 
money in private industry – in particular someone like Friedrich Merz – joined Habermas in his newly 
acquired love for military action. 
23 There is now a long literature on alternatives to the euro in its current form. It includes splitting 
the euro between North and South, or allowing for dual currency regimes, with national currencies 
floating against the supranational euro, as currently envisaged by the “populist” government of Italy 
(“Mini-Bots”). This is not the place to discuss the various projects and its prospects.
able to impose their economic and political systems on the world at 
large – a non-imperialistic, non-universalistic “peaceful coexistence”, in 
particular between China and a United States that would, somehow, be 
cured from its neoliberal one-world sense of mission. Interstate relations, 
although not necessarily inter-society relations, would be governed by 
respect of difference. International economic relations could by and large 
be free from colonialism and post-colonialism, and European countries 
might even be able to work out a peaceful settlement with what is now 
their appointed bête noir, Russia. Strong incentives to create an integrat-
ed European military would be lacking; the project of a “European army” 
would lose plausibility and become unfit as a vehicle for the formation of 
a European superstate; and the “war on terror” could be delegated, as it 
long should have been, to cooperative international police-work. 
Numerous questions would arise, in particular on the capacity of a 
decentralized state system based primarily on voluntary cooperation to 
respond to global problems such as climate change, tax evasion and the 
regulation of finance and money. This can only be touched upon here, the 
central point being to remember how little if anything both “rule-based 
global governance” and European superstatism have achieved on these 
crucial matters in the three or four decades of their existence. A turn to 
“regional planning” might set in motion an overdue search for effective 
local and national policies, leaving behind the internationalist mantra 
that global problems can be resolved only by global government – which 
would not only have to happen in the absence of democratic control but 
would also be unlikely to happen in the first place, making calls for it a 
comfortable excuse for doing nothing. Keywords include capital controls; 
the nationalization, in the sense of de-globalization, of banks and other 
financial firms; shifting the tax base to immovable assets and unearned 
(“windfall”) capital gains; building regional planning alliances among 
adjacent, similar countries; adapting infrastructures to climate change 
by increasing public spending, also on large-scale geo-engineering; the 
mobilization of local and national pride on good environmental behavior 
(CO-free cities), etc. I cannot see that in terms of their effectiveness, 
such measures would necessarily be inferior to what internationalists 
have offered until now and what they can realistically hope to offer in the, 
crucially important, near future.24
24 In the German discussion, those who insist on the benefits and potentialities of nation-state 
economic sovereignty tend to be accused of Kleinstaaterei (as happened for example to this author; 
Habermas 2013). The concept was invented by German nationalists in the early nineteenth century in 
their polemic against the traditional political organization of the Holy Roman Empire of the German 
Nation (Altes Reich), which sustained a large number of free cities and small principalities. Today 
the term is used by advocates of a centralized European superstate against proponents of a less 
hierarchical and more voluntary, cooperative instead of imperial European state system. Their answer 
(Streeck 2013) is in turn to accuse their opponents of Großstaaterei, a concept invented in response, 
as a reminder of Max Weber’s fatal belief that Germany had to become a Machtstaat in order to de-
fend its “culture”, or “way of life” (?), in a hostile international environment.






































Returning to the global context of Europe, it appears that just as in 
Polanyi’s analysis, the main obstacle to a pluralist global order may be 
the United States. Having conquered the Soviet Union, the U.S. would 
have to learn to withdraw from its far-flung network of allies and outposts 
and confirm “America first” to mean prioritizing domestic over interna-
tional needs. The question is, of course, if this is possible – whether for 
example the U.S. economy has become too dependent on its country’s 
international dominance to be able to do without it. In this case the U.S. 
would have to perceive the rise of China as a deadly threat, as it would 
mean diminished American access to global resources and higher prices 
for American imports of raw materials. Also, continued American hostili-
ty to countries like Iran might make these natural allies, not just of Russia 
but also of China, which would further exacerbate tensions between the 
two twenty-first century superpowers. Such tensions would, of course, 
advance the credibility of a military justification for a superstate-like cen-
tralization of the European state system. 
The armed superstate project of “European integration” apparently 
comes in two versions, French and German, linked to different percep-
tions of the constraints and opportunities inherent in a Chinese-Amer-
ican struggle for global hegemony.25 In both, European state-building 
proceeds via European empire-tightening, curtailing the autonomy and 
suspending the democracy of member states. The French version sees 
Europe as a third big player in rough equidistance from the U.S. and 
China, whereas the German version envisages something like a sub-
empire of the United States joining it in its fight with the Chinese and, 
for not entirely obvious reasons, the Russians. In practice, distinguishing 
between the two “visions” is not always easy, not just because the exact 
nature of the future American-Chinese relationship is not known, but also 
because France and Germany are struggling over the EU’s finalité while 
hiding as much as possible their quite fundamental disagreement. The 
matter is further complicated by the fact that there still is in the German 
foreign policy establishment a minority “Gaullist” faction contesting the 
pro-American majority “Atlanticist” faction, as represented above all by 
Angela Merkel and her hand-picked could-be successor.26
A few selected points must suffice to illustrate the differences 
between the French and German visions of a European state system or-
25 Discussions on the subject, to the extent that they are taking place at all, are cloaked in diplomatic 
secrecy, as are all other important discussions on “European integration”. One is forced here to rely 
on personal contacts and current reporting in the “quality press”, the latter restrained by a strong 
determination not to appear “anti-European”. 
26 Merkel has, as is generally characteristic of her, avoided taking a public position, both denying 
that there are differences at all and liberally making unfulfillable and incompatible promises to all 
sides, hoping to get away with it by contingently arising emergencies diverting attention from them 
or rendering them outdated. That time is running out for politics of this kind, also because too many 
promises have been accumulated which sooner or later require to be either redeemed is one reason 
why Merkel’s time is also running out.
ganized as an armed European superstate. The French concept of a third 
hegemon presupposes global tensions strong enough to unify Europe 
but not strong enough to force it to choose sides. It also presupposes the 
hefty increase in German military spending that is currently being prom-
ised, which will compensate for the large share of French defense expen-
diture having to be spent on the national nuclear force. Since the force 
de frappe will remain under French control, it will ensure a dominant role 
for France in the geopolitics of a future European superstate, also be-
cause France will after Brexit be the sole EU member state with a perma-
nent seat on the United Nations Security Council. German conventional 
forces under European command, in particular German ground troops, 
will be needed to fight postcolonial wars in French Africa and perhaps 
the Middle East, in order to secure European access to natural resources 
and keep Europe’s Chinese and American rivals in Southern Europe and 
Northern Africa at bay. Inside Europe, priority would be given to keep-
ing the Mediterranean countries on board and ready to be governed from 
the European center, which would require compensation for the damage 
inflicted on their economies by the hard common currency. One form of 
such compensation could be a special budget for the Eurozone paid for, 
in effect, by Northern European surplus countries, above all Germany. A 
French third hegemon strategy would also allow for some sort of détente 
with Russia, given the lower importance for France of Eastern compared 
to Southern Europe and, importantly, Northern Africa.27
Unlike the French European superstate, its German alternative 
would fundamentally be a market state with strong interests in the Eu-
ropean East, in potential collision with Russia and with a strong Trans-
Atlantic affinity to the U.S. National, or supranational, security would be 
derived, in addition to Europe’s own efforts, from a nuclear military pact 
with the United States. Its hour would come with a reassertion of Ameri-
can expansionism and a serious confrontation with Chinese expansion-
ism. One role of Europe as a sub-empire of a re-founded American-led 
West, perhaps including the United Kingdom in a “special relationship” 
after its separation from the EU, would be to keep Russia in check, pre-
venting it from projecting its power into the Middle East and the Medi-
terranean and binding Russian forces that might otherwise be used to 
support an alliance with China in Africa or elsewhere. A confrontational 
European stance with Russia would also keep the Eastern European 
countries in the Western European empire, insuring their elites against 
the risks of taking a hostile view of Russian regional security interests 
(preventing, in other words, the kind of regional peacemaking through 
“regional planning” envisaged in 1945 by Polanyi or later practiced in 
Scandinavia in the form of what came to be called “Finlandization”). Ger-
man conventional superiority over Russia would be backed up by Ameri-
27 In a nutshell, what is Eastern Europe for Germany is Northern Africa for France.






































can nuclear power, which would be enlisted for European interests by 
providing the United States with vital logistical support for their Middle 
Eastern wars, for example and in particular through military bases in 
Germany.28 In political terms, an imperial “European project” integrated 
in an American-led “West” might be difficult to sell to voters outside of 
Eastern Europe as long as Trump or another “ugly American” holds power 
in Washington. But the same may be true under a new-leftist Democratic 
president. While culturally a Kennedy of the twenty-first century (for ex-
ample Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez!), politically he or she might be even 
more isolationist than Trump initially tried to be. It would seem that the 
German version of a military path to European unity, unlike the French 
one, presupposes a return to power (or at least a realistic possibility of 
such a return) of Clinton-style American liberalism or, more likely, a suc-
cessful resistance of the American “deep state” – the country’s military-
industrial-intelligence complex – against isolationist attempts, left or 
right, to subordinate international priorities to domestic ones.
Conclusion
An interregnum is a time of high uncertainty, with respect to both how 
long it will last and how it will end. Nobody knows how the United States 
and China will settle their relationship, if at all. They may for an indefinite 
period be wavering between conflict and accommodation, between peace, 
cold war, and war, shrinking back or not from the abyss as they (perhaps 
repeatedly) approach it. Nor do we know what the ongoing rapid digitiza-
tion of military technology will contribute: drones being only the begin-
ning, followed by robots fighting robots as they attack infrastructures and 
troops, accompanied by ever more sophisticated cyber warfare against 
vital domestic telecommunications and data processing systems. 
Equally uncertain is how long the “populist” defense within the Eu-
ropean state system of local autonomy against supranational centralism 
will endure. International scare mongering by integration-minded Euro-
pean elites may push back centrifugal forces, or it may not. French hopes 
for a more isolationist United States and German hopes for an Ameri-
can return to “multilateralism” may both be disappointed as the United 
States may remain torn between an “America first” electorate and an 
internationalist military establishment. Moreover, French and American 
expectations, nourished by the Merkel government, of a Germany arming 
28 The biggest of them, and indeed the biggest installation of the U.S. Airforce outside of the United 
States, is Ramstein in Rhineland-Palatinate. It houses about 9,000 troops, including civilian person-
nel. The air base is used as a European hub for the transport of troops, materiel and prisoners world-
wide. It is also used for evacuation flights as it is close to Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, the 
biggest military hospital outside the United States. The hospital is also used for debriefing American 
troops and the interrogation of prisoners. Importantly, from Ramstein Air base the U.S. military plans 
and controls its “war on terror” drone operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Yemen and Pakistan 
(https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ramstein_Air_Base). All in all there are currently about 32,000 Ameri-
can troops stationed in Germany. 
itself to the teeth and placing its military under non-German command, 
thereby extracting it from national parliamentary control, may be frus-
trated by German voters and parties. And who will win the battle in Ger-
many between the “Gaullists” and the “Atlanticists”? The former needs a 
France that is not Lepenist, the latter a United States that is not Trumpist. 
Perhaps here, too, all one can predict is a drawn-out period of indecision, 
amid doubts whether Germany will be able and willing to pay the rising 
price of keeping its liberal European empire together, above and beyond 
the two percent for a larger and better military.
What we may be in for, then, is a long Hängepartie, a period of ir-
resolution with uncertain events but still productively conceivable within 
the parameters of Polanyi’s 1945 essay: universalism vs. pluralism, one 
world or more, gold standard vs. “regional planning”, empire vs. sover-
eignty, countermovement from the right vs. the left, etc. In all this uncer-
tain complexity, or complex uncertainty, the architecture of the European 
state system – its politics of scale and hierarchy – may remain an open 
question, preventing Europeans from politically defining and pursuing 
their interests in peace, democracy, and prosperity. Playing around with 
military means to centralize European politics, European political elites 
may at some point cease to understand what they are getting into and, 
like in 1914, unintentionally start a wildfire beyond their control.29 
29 The politics of the arming of Europe is in rapid flux. By the end of 2019 an open rift had appeared 
between Germany and France, caused not least by Macron’s and the French military’s refusal to hand 
over the Force de frappe to “European” control. In response Germany confirmed its commitment to 
NATO, Trump and all, after Macron had publicly pronounced NATO “braindead”. For a preliminary 
assessment see a brief analysis I contributed to the Spanish internet magazine, El salto: https://wolf-
gangstreeck.files.wordpress.com/2019/12/el-salto-19-11.pdf. 





















Anderson, Perry, 2017: The H-Word: The Peripeteia of Hegemony. London, New York: Verso.
Habermas, Jürgen, 2013: Demokratie oder Kapitalismus? Vom Elend der nationalstaatlichen 
Fragmentierung in einer kapitalistisch integrierten Weltgesellschaft. Blätter für deutsche und interna-
tionale Politik. Vol. 58, No. 5, 59-70.
Lee, Ching Kwan, 2017: The Specter of Global China: Politics, Labor and Foreign Investment in 
Africa. Chicago and London: Chicago University Press.
Polanyi, Karl, 1945: Universal Capitalism or Regional Planning? The London Quarterly of World 
Affairs. Vol. 3, No. 1, 1-6.
Polanyi, Karl, 2018: Economy and Society: Selected Writings. Editzed by Michele Cangiani and 
Claus Thomasberger. Cambridge, UK: Polity.
Streeck, Wolfgang, 2013: Vom DM-Nationalismus zum Euro-Patriotismus? Eine Replik auf Jür-
gen Habermas. Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik. Vol. 58, No. 9, 75-92.
Streeck, Wolfgang, 2019: Reflections on Political Scale. Adam Smith Lecture in Jurisprudence 
2018, University of Glasgow. Jurisprudence: An International Journal of Legal and Political Thought. 
Vol. 10, No. 1, 1-14.
Watkins, Susan, 2019: America vs China. New Left Review. Vol. 115, Jan/Feb 2019, 5-14.
The International State System after Neoliberalism
